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FITNESS FOR TRIAL IN THE DISTRICT 
COURT: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
DARIUS WHELAN∗ 
 
 
Reform of the law on fitness to plead has been discussed for 
decades. For example, in 1978, the Henchy Committee produced 
a report outlining major changes which were necessary.1 The 
Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006, enacted 28 years after the 
Henchy report, finally came into force on 1 June 2006 and 
introduces significant changes to the law in this area.     
There are a number of useful sources which may be 
consulted for description and analysis of the law prior to the 
enactment of this new legislation.2 The Act does not change the 
common law definition of unfitness to plead, but instead the 
changes it introduces concentrate on important procedural 
questions such as the introduction of automatic periodic reviews 
of detention and provision for appeals from fitness to plead 
decisions.3   
_____________________________________________________ 
∗ Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University College Cork. This article is 
based on the text of an address delivered at the Annual Conference of the 
District Court, organised under the auspices of the Judicial Studies Institute, on 
27 April 2007. 
1 Third Interim Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Mentally Ill and 
Maladjusted Persons. Treatment and Care of Persons Suffering from Mental 
Disorder Who Appear Before the Courts on Criminal Charges [Chair: Henchy 
J.] (Prl. 8275, J85/1, Stationery Office, Dublin, 1978).   
2 See for example, McAuley, Insanity, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility 
(Round Hall Press, Dublin, 1993); Casey & Craven, Psychiatry and the Law 
(Oak Tree Press, Dublin, 1999); Charleton, McDermott & Bolger, Criminal 
Law (Butterworths, Dublin, 1999); Hanly, An Introduction to Irish Criminal 
Law (2nd ed., Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 2006); McIntyre & McMullan, 
Criminal Law (2nd ed., Thomson Round Hall, Dublin, 2005); Whelan, “Some 
Procedural Aspects of Insanity Cases” (2001) 11(3) Irish Criminal Law 
Journal 3; Whelan, “Fitness to Plead and Insanity in the District Court” (2001) 
11(2) Irish Criminal Law Journal 2. 
3 For general reviews of the Act see McGillicuddy, “The Criminal Law 
(Insanity) Act 2006” (2006) 11 Bar Review 95 and Whelan, “The Criminal 
Law (Insanity) Act 2006” (2006) Irish Current Law Statutes Annotated. For 
commentary on earlier versions of the Bill, see Conway, “Fitness to Plead in 
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One of the reasons the Act was introduced was to attempt to 
satisfy the requirements of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Under Article 5(4) of the Convention, everyone who is 
deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention is entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of their detention will be 
decided speedily by a court and their release ordered if the 
detention is not lawful. According to media reports, the Trial of 
Lunatics Act 1883 was being challenged as a breach of the 
Constitution and the European Convention.4 
This paper concentrates on fitness for trial in the District 
Court and will deal with the topic under two main headings: 
firstly, how does the District Court determine fitness for trial and 
secondly, the consequences of a finding of unfitness for trial.    
In other jurisdictions, a judge in a court at equivalent level 
to the District Court might well have a larger number of 
possibilities open to him or her in dealing with a person who has a 
mental disorder. For example, in England and Wales, courts have 
wider powers to remand a person to hospital for a report on their 
medical condition, or to make a hospital order without 
conviction.5  There are also more developed policies and schemes 
for diversion of people with mental disorders from the criminal 
justice system.6  In some other jurisdictions, mental health courts 
have been established to cope with the complexity of the 
interaction between criminal law and mental health.7   
                                                                                                                    
Light of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002” (2003) 13(4) Irish Criminal 
Law Journal 2; Mills, “Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002: Putting the Sanity 
Back into Insanity” (2003) 8 Bar Review 101; Robinson, “Crazy Situation” 
(2003) 97 (1) Law Society Gazette 12. 
4 Mary Carolan, ‘Man who threw daughter from bridge challenges his 
detention’, Irish Times, 21 June 2005. 
5 See Bartlett & Sandland, Mental Health Law: Policy and Practice (3rd ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chapter 6. For statistical analysis see 
Mackay, Mitchell & Howe, “A Continued Upturn in Unfitness to Plead - More 
Disability in relation to the Trial under the 1991 Act” [2007] Criminal Law 
Review 530. 
6 For the current situation in Ireland, see O'Neill, “Liaison between Criminal 
Justice and Psychiatric Systems: Diversion Services” (2006) 23(3) Irish 
Journal of Psychological Medicine 87. 
7 Erickson et al, “Variations in Mental Health Courts: Challenges, 
Opportunities, and a Call for Caution” (2006) 42 Community Mental Health 
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Given the limited number of options which are available to 
the courts under our current arrangements, judges must attempt to 
choose between the alternative courses of action available, 
bearing in mind such principles as the right to liberty, the right to 
a fair trial and the duty to protect the accused person and/or the 
public in appropriate cases. 
 
   
I. DETERMINATION OF FITNESS FOR TRIAL 
Where a person is before the District Court charged with a 
summary offence, or with an indictable offence which is being or 
is to be tried summarily, any question as to whether the accused is 
fit to be tried must be determined by the District Court.8 
However, in the case of an indictable offence which is not being 
tried summarily, the question of fitness for trial must be 
determined by the court of trial to which the person would have 
been sent forward if he or she were fit to be tried and the District 
Court must send the person forward to that court for the purpose 
of determining the issue.9 
Problems may arise if the accused is unable, due to a mental 
disorder, to consent to summary trial of an indictable offence. 
One interpretation would require that in such a case the person 
must be sent forward for trial in another court. However, another 
interpretation might permit the District Court to determine the 
question of fitness for trial as the Act specifically states that the 
question of the accused’s ability to elect for a jury trial is one of 
the questions relevant to fitness to be tried.10  McGillicuddy has 
considered this point in detail.11 
 
                                                                                                                    
Journal 335; Schneider et al, Mental Health Courts: Decriminalizing the 
Mentally Ill (Toronto:  Irwin Law, 2007). 
8 S.4(3)(a) Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. 
9 S.4(4)(a) Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. 
10 S.4(2)(c) Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. 
11 McGillicuddy, “The Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006” (2006) 11 Bar 
Review 95 at 96 and “The Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002”, 2 April 2006, 
www.lawlibrary.ie, p.5.  
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A. The Definition of Unfitness for Trial 
The Act restates the common law definition of unfitness for 
trial in section 4(2) as follows: 
 
An accused person shall be deemed unfit to be tried if he 
or she is unable by reason of mental disorder to 
understand the nature or course of the proceedings so as 
to — 
 
(a) plead to the charge, 
(b) instruct a legal representative, 
(c) in the case of an indictable offence which may be 
tried summarily, elect for a trial by jury, 
(d) make a proper defence, 
(e) in the case of a trial by jury, challenge a juror to 
whom he or she might wish to object, or 
(f) understand the evidence. 
 
‘‘Mental disorder’’, as defined in section 1, includes mental 
illness, mental disability, dementia or any disease of the mind, but 
does not include intoxication. 
The definition does not appear to cover a person with a 
physical disability, such as a deaf person who cannot understand 
sign language interpretation. It has been suggested that the 
common law rules regarding fitness to plead of people with 
physical disabilities will continue to apply.12 The 2006 Act does 
not repeal s.28 of the Juries Act 1976, which states that: 
“[w]henever a person charged with an offence to be tried with a 
jury stands mute when called upon to plead, the issue whether he 
is mute of malice or by the visitation of God shall be decided by 
the judge and, if the judge is not satisfied that he is mute by the 
visitation of God, the judge shall direct a plea of not guilty to be 
entered for him.”13 
_____________________________________________________ 
12 McGillicuddy, “The Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006” (2006) 11 Bar 
Review 95 at 96. 
13 See Ryan & Magee, The Irish Criminal Process (Mercier Press, Dublin and 
Cork, 1983), p.268; Walsh, Criminal Procedure (Dublin: Thomson Round 
Hall, 2002), p.779. 
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It is arguable that the test for unfitness for trial should 
require a higher level of analytical capacity.14 The opportunity 
could have been taken to develop the criteria beyond the 
traditional cognitive ones (whether the person can understand the 
nature and course of the proceedings so as to make a proper 
defence, instruct a lawyer, etc.) to a broader test of intellectual 
capacity. Is it really sufficient that a person may be tried on a very 
serious criminal charge on the basis that he or she understands 
what is going on? It has been persuasively argued elsewhere that 
the law should require a person to have “decisional capacity” so 
that they can be a true participant in the process.15 In addition, the 
Scottish Law Commission16 has proposed that the test for 
unfitness for trial should be based on the person’s ability to 
participate effectively in the proceedings, based partly on 
European Court of Human Rights case-law such as Stanford v. 
United Kingdom17 and T. and V. v. United Kingdom.18 Such a 
widening of the scope of unfitness for trial would be more 
protective of the person's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Conway notes, however, that it is possible to argue that the 
inclusion of the general ground of ability to make a proper 
defence in the criteria for unfitness for trial allows the criteria to 
be widened beyond the traditional cognitive ones.19 
 
B. Procedure Prior to Determination of the Issue 
The 2006 Act does not require that medical evidence be 
heard before a finding of unfitness for trial is made.20 Nor does it 
_____________________________________________________ 
14 Schneider & Bloom, “R v Taylor: A Decision Not in the Best Interests of 
Some Mentally Ill Accused” (1995) 38 Criminal Law Quarterly 183. 
15 Mackay, Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.244-245. 
16 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Insanity and Diminished 
Responsibility (2003) and Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility 
(2004) 
17 Series A, No.282, 25 January 1994. 
18 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 121. 
19 Conway “Fitness to Plead in Light of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002” 
(2003) 13(4) Irish Criminal Law Journal 2 at 3-4. 
20 If arguments arise about the applicability of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to determinations of fitness for trial, reference 
may be made to the English cases in which it was held that such determinations 
are not part of criminal proceedings:  R. v. M., K. and H. [2001] E.W.C.A. 
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require that the person be committed to a hospital at this stage for 
assessment of their mental condition. Even though medical 
evidence is not required by the Act at this stage, it would 
obviously be desirable to hear such evidence where appropriate.  
For that purpose, the Court may wish to allow time for medical 
evidence to be obtained. 
There are two main choices open to the District Court if the 
question of fitness for trial arises and the parties are not ready to 
proceed with the issue on the day, or if reports need to be 
prepared prior to determining the issue: remand to a prison21 or 
remand on bail. In the case of remand on bail, possibilities such 
as attachment of conditions may be considered.   
If the Court remands the person on bail, the question of 
fitness to enter into a recognisance would arise. In R. v. Green-
Emmott,22 it was held that a person who has been certified as 
insane cannot enter into a binding recognisance. Walsh J. referred 
to this precedent in State (C.) v. Minister for Justice23 and 
concluded that if the District Court decided that the person was 
unfit for trial, the Court would have no alternative but to remand 
the person in custody as he or she would not be able to enter into 
a recognisance.24 It is unfortunate that the 2006 Act did not 
address this problem, for example by abolishing the mandatory 
recognisance in cases where the defendant is mentally unfit.25   
If the person is fit to enter into a recognisance, the Court 
might consider attaching conditions to the recognisance, relating 
to the person’s mental disorder. The Bail Act 1997 states that the 
recognisance may be subject to such conditions as the Court 
                                                                                                                    
Crim. 2024; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 824, R v. Grant [2001] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2611; 
[2002] 1 Q.B. 1030 and R. v. H. [2003] U.K.H.L. 1; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 411. 
21 If the person is remanded to prison, it is possible for him or her to be 
transferred to the Central Mental Hospital under s.15 of the Criminal Law 
(Insanity) Act 2006. The transfer is directed by the Governor of the prison, on 
receipt of appropriate psychiatric certification, and no court appearance is 
required. 
22 (1931) 22 Cr. App. R. 183; 29 Cox C.C. 280. 
23 [1967] I.R. 106 (S.C.). 
24 [1967] I.R. 106 at 126 (S.C.). 
25 The Henchy Committee proposed adjournments of up to six months if a 
person was unable by reason of mental disorder to enter into a recognisance: 
supra, note 1, draft Bill, s.37. 
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considers appropriate having regard to the circumstances of the 
case.26 The conditions might include a requirement that the 
person attend a particular psychiatric centre on an outpatient 
basis.27 Alternatively, conditions could require that the person 
permit himself or herself to be admitted to a psychiatric centre.28 
The Court does not have a statutory power to remand the 
person in custody to a local hospital. However, the Court might in 
some cases comment on the possible need for treatment of the 
person. If the Court is satisfied that the person will seek treatment 
on a voluntary basis, then that may be sufficient. Otherwise, the 
Court could inquire of the Gardaí whether they have considered 
using their power to take a person believed to have a mental 
disorder into custody under section 12 of the Mental Health Act 
2001. This taking into custody must be followed forthwith by an 
application to a doctor for a recommendation for admission to an 
approved centre under the 2001 Act. Alternatively, the Gardaí 
may make an application under section 9 of the 2001 Act, without 
taking the person into custody.   
It has recently been recognised that in some cases if a 
person with a mental disorder is released from detention due to a 
breach of a statutory requirement, courts may take account of the 
person’s mental disorder and need for treatment and ensure that 
arrangements are put in place for a fresh application for detention 
to be made.29 By analogy, an argument could be made that the 
_____________________________________________________ 
26 S.6(1)(b) Bail Act 1997. 
27 See discussion of the English equivalent in Bartlett & Sandland, Mental 
Health Law: Policy and Practice (3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p.215. 
28 See O’Neill, “Diverting the Mentally Ill from District Courts:  Consequential 
Options”, Annual District Court conference, Adare, 2007, slide 24, where an 
example of conditional bail is given: The prison governor and a general 
practitioner complete forms in advance for admission under the Mental Health 
Act 2001; the bail conditions are that the accused permits himself to be brought 
to hospital, will remain there until discharged if he is admitted, will afterwards 
reside with his sister, accept appropriate treatment and abstain from illicit 
drugs. 
29 H. v. Russel, High Court, unreported, Clarke J., 6 February 2007; A.M.C. v. 
St. Luke’s Hospital, Clonmel, High Court, unreported, Peart J., 28 February 
2007. See also Cunningham & Keane, “Summary of Article 40.4 Judgments 
since the Commencement of the Mental Health Act 2001” (Dublin:  Mental 
Health Commission, 2007)   
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District Court may in appropriate criminal cases facilitate 
involuntary civil detention of a person under the Mental Health 
Act 2001. 
The Criminal Procedure Act 1967, as amended, provides 
that if the District Court is satisfied that any person who has been 
remanded is unable by reason of illness or accident to appear or to 
be brought before the court at the expiration of the period of 
remand, the Court may, in his or her absence, remand the person 
on bail or in custody for an extended period.30 There are 
authorities which support the use of this power in cases of mental 
disorders.31 Care must be taken to comply with all the 
requirements of the section, e.g. it can only be used when the 
person has already been remanded at least once, and the person 
must be “unable” to appear in court.   
An argument might be made that section 4(6) of the 2006 
Act allows the District Court to commit the person to the Central 
Mental Hospital32 for up to fourteen days before determining the 
question of fitness for trial. Section 4(6) provides as follows: 
 
(a)  For the purpose of determining whether or not to 
exercise a power under subsection (3) or (5) the court 
– 
 
(i)  for that purpose, may commit him or her to a 
designated centre for a period of not more 
than 14 days, and 
 
(ii) shall direct that the accused person concerned 
be examined by an approved medical officer 
at that centre. 
(b) Within the period of committal authorised by the 
court under this subsection, the approved medical 
officer concerned shall report to the court on whether 
_____________________________________________________ 
30 S.24(5) Criminal Procedure Act 1967, as substituted by s.4 Criminal Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997. See also Order 19(4) of District Court 
Rules 1997, S.I. No.93 of 1997.   
31 In Re Dolphin: State (Egan) v. Governor of Central Mental Hospital, High 
Court, unreported, Kenny J., 27 January 1972; State (Caseley) v. Daly & 
O’Sullivan, High Court, unreported, Gannon J., 19 February 1979. 
32 The Act refers to a “designated centre”. At present the Central Mental 
Hospital is the only such centre. 
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in his or her opinion the accused person committed 
under paragraph (a) is— 
 
(i)  suffering from a mental disorder (within the 
meaning of the Act of 2001) and is in need of 
in-patient care or treatment in a designated 
centre, or 
 
(ii) suffering from a mental disorder or from a 
mental disorder (within the meaning of the 
Act of 2001) and is in need of out-patient 
care or treatment in a designated centre. 
 
It seems unlikely that section 4(6) allows committal before 
determining fitness for trial. The contents of the psychiatric report 
which must be produced by the approved medical officer as 
specified in section 4(6)(b), are relevant to the question of making 
an appropriate order in relation to the person after he or she has 
been found unfit for trial. If the psychiatric report were to assist 
the Court in determining fitness for trial, then the sub-section 
would require that the report address the person’s ability to 
understand the nature and course of the proceedings.33 In 
addition, section 4(6) refers to the “exercise” of a “power” under 
subsections (3) or (5), and this seems to apply to making an 
appropriate order after the person has been found unfit for trial34 
rather than the sub-section which refers to the “question” of 
fitness for trial being “determined” by the court.35 Finally, it is 
only in the sub-section concerning making an order after a finding 
of unfitness for trial36 that reference is made to the Court 
considering the psychiatric report adduced under section 4(6). 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
33 S.4(2) Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. 
34 S.4(3)(b). 
35 S.4(3)(a). 
36 S.4(3)(b). 
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C. Raising the Issue 
The question of fitness for trial may arise at the instance of 
the defence, the prosecution or the court.37 The defence must have 
notified the prosecution, within ten days of the accused being 
asked how he or she wishes to plead, that it intends to adduce 
evidence of the accused’s mental condition.38   
The duty of the District Court to consider the issue of fitness 
for trial arose in Leonard v. Garavan & D.P.P.39 The applicant, 
Ms. Leonard, had been convicted in the District Court of public 
order offences and assault. A Garda gave evidence that she was 
“roaring about God and the Devil and was calling down curses 
upon all those present.” In the witness box, she made a fifteen-
minute speech about her crusade against drug dealers. She had no 
legal representation during the trial. She had been asked about 
representation and said she would represent herself. She 
continuously shouted and interrupted the judge. Once convicted, 
she was transferred from Mountjoy to the Central Mental 
Hospital. She applied to the High Court for certiorari of the 
convictions and there was medical evidence to the effect that she 
was in a manic state and had bipolar affective disorder. 
McKechnie J. quashed the convictions, saying that the applicant 
did not have any appreciation of what was going on and she was 
effectively “unfit to plead.” The case should not have proceeded, 
or alternatively, there was sufficient evidence before the judge to 
warrant an inquiry into her mental state, which should have taken 
place. He also held that she should have been offered legal 
representation again at sentencing stage.   
 
D. Deferral of the Issue 
_____________________________________________________ 
37 S.4(1) Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006.   
38 S.19. 
39 [2003] 4 I.R. 60 (H.C.).  See also the earlier case of D.P.P. (Murphy) v. P.T. 
[1999] 3 I.R. 254 (H.C.), where a fifteen year old boy was charged in the 
District Court with larceny of a sports jacket. The boy was placed in the care of 
the Eastern Health Board and the judge adjourned the proceedings to chambers 
to consider his medical and psychiatric condition. Documents appear to have 
shown a preliminary diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome. The judge later 
decided to inquire into his fitness to plead of his (the judge’s) own initiative. 
McGuinness J. in the High Court confirmed that the District Court was under a 
duty to enquire into P.T.’s fitness to plead. 
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Where the question arises as to whether or not the accused 
is fit to be tried and the Court considers that it is expedient and in 
the interests of the accused so to do, it may defer consideration of 
the question until any time before the opening of the case for the 
defence.40 There is a similar statutory provision in England, s.4 of 
the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, and it has been held 
there that deferral may be used where the prosecution case is 
thin.41    
 
 
II. CONSEQUENCES OF A FINDING OF  
UNFITNESS FOR TRIAL 
If the District Court determines that an accused person is 
unfit to be tried the Court must adjourn the proceedings until 
further order.42 If the Court determines that the person is fit to be 
tried, the case continues.43   
Committal for examination and medical report are 
obligatory if the Court wishes to detain a person found unfit for 
trial or order out-patient treatment in the Central Mental Hospital 
(CMH) for him or her. If the Court considers that the person does 
not require either in-patient or out-patient treatment in the CMH, 
then the Court has the power to release the person immediately.44 
This power might be used, for example, in a case where a person 
is unfit for trial due to dementia but is already being well cared 
for either in their home or in a residential setting. 
If the Court is considering in-patient or out-patient treatment 
in the Central Mental Hospital, the Court commits the person to 
the Hospital for up to 14 days and directs a psychiatric report 
from an approved medical officer.45 This 14-day period for 
examination cannot be extended.46 
_____________________________________________________ 
40 S.4(7). 
41 R. v. Burles [1970] 2 Q.B. 191.  See also R. v. Webb [1969] 2 Q.B. 178.   
42 S.4(3)(b). 
43 S.4(3)(c). 
44 Under the European Convention on Human Rights, a person may only be 
detained if he or she has a mental disorder warranting detention at that time. 
45 S.4(6)(a). 
46 Contrast insanity cases – s.5(3)(b) of 2006 Act. 
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The Mental Health Commission recommended that the Bill 
should be amended to facilitate remand of the person on bail in 
order to attend for assessment on an outpatient basis.47 
Keys has argued that the power of the court to refer for 
assessment based on its own view and without a medical 
assessment may be contrary to the principle in Winterwerp v. The 
Netherlands48 that detention in psychiatric care must be based on 
objective medical expertise.49   
The District Court may, if it is satisfied, having considered 
the evidence of the approved medical officer and any other 
evidence, that the person is suffering from a mental disorder 
(within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2001) and is in 
need of in-patient care or treatment, commit the person to the 
Central Mental Hospital.50 Note that it is only possible to detain 
the person in the Central Mental Hospital, not in any other 
psychiatric facility. The duration of the detention will be until an 
order is made under section 13.51 An order under section 13 is an 
order by the Mental Health (Criminal Law) Review Board 
making such order as it thinks proper in relation to the patient e.g. 
further care, conditional discharge, unconditional discharge, out-
patient treatment or supervision. 
Alternatively, the court may order out-patient treatment in 
the CMH, in which case mental disorder as defined either in the 
2001 Act or the 2006 Act may be involved.52 As it is located in 
Dublin, the option of out-patient treatment in the CMH is not 
practical for people residing outside the Dublin region. The 
possibility of out-patient treatment was added as a late 
amendment to the Bill as Minister McDowell believed that “no 
one with a mental disorder should be inappropriately held in 
police custody or in prison.”53 He also referred to the Henchy 
report and the submission of the Mental Health Commission as 
_____________________________________________________ 
47 Mental Health Commission, Second Submission on Criminal Law (Insanity) 
Bill 2002, January 2006. 
48 (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 387. 
49 Mary Keys, unpublished paper on Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002, p.5. 
50 The Central Mental Hospital is currently the only “designated centre” under 
the 2006 Act. 
51 S.4(3)(b)(i). 
52 S.4(3)(b)(ii).    
53 616 Dáil Debates 2059 (Report and Final Stages, 23 March 2006). 
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reasons to introduce the possibility of out-patient treatment. Note, 
however, that out-patient treatment was not introduced as an 
option for those found not guilty by reason of insanity.54 The 
possibility of out-patient treatment contrasts with the regime 
concerning civil detention under the Mental Health Act 2001, 
where Mental Health Tribunals may only confirm or revoke an 
admission order, and cannot order out-patient treatment. 
The person can only be detained if he or she has a mental 
disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2001.  
Under s.3(1) of that Act, ‘‘mental disorder’’ means mental illness, 
severe dementia or significant intellectual disability where— 
 
 (a) because of the illness, disability or dementia, there is a 
serious likelihood of the person concerned causing 
immediate and serious harm to himself or herself or to 
other persons, or 
 
 (b) (i) because of the severity of the illness, disability or 
dementia, the judgement of the person concerned 
is so impaired that failure to admit the person to 
an approved centre would be likely to lead to a 
serious deterioration in his or her condition or 
would prevent the administration of appropriate 
treatment that could be given only by such 
admission, and 
 
  (ii) the reception, detention and treatment of the 
person concerned in an approved centre would be 
likely to benefit or alleviate the condition of that 
person to a material extent. 
 
It has recently been held that while definitions (a) and (b) 
are expressed as alternatives, in many cases there would be 
substantial overlap between the two and a person could be 
classified as falling under both definitions at once.55 
Detailed definitions of mental illness, severe dementia and 
significant intellectual disability are provided in s.3(2) of the 
2001 Act: “Mental illness” means a state of mind of a person 
_____________________________________________________ 
54 S.5(2). 
55 R. v. Byrne and Flynn, High Court, unreported, O’Neill J., 2 March 2007. 
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which affects the person’s thinking, perceiving, emotion or 
judgment and which seriously impairs the mental function of the 
person to the extent that he or she requires care or medical 
treatment in his or her own interest or in the interest of other 
persons. “Severe dementia” means a deterioration of the brain of 
a person which significantly impairs the intellectual function of 
the person thereby affecting thought, comprehension and memory 
and which includes severe psychiatric or behavioural symptoms 
such as physical aggression. “Significant intellectual disability” 
means a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind of a 
person which includes significant impairment of intelligence and 
social functioning and abnormally aggressive or seriously 
irresponsible conduct on the part of the person. 
It is unclear whether section 8 of the Mental Health Act 
2001, which states that a person cannot be detained under that Act 
solely because of a personality disorder, applies to a detention 
under section 4 of the 2006 Act. The 2006 Act specifically states 
that a person found unfit for trial can only be detained if he or she 
has a mental disorder within the meaning of the 2001 Act, but it is 
unclear whether the section of that Act prohibiting detention 
based on personality disorder alone has an impact on “a mental 
disorder within the meaning of the 2001 Act”. Minister 
McDowell referred to section 8 and said: “It may or may not be 
that this is a tacit admission that mental disorder could include a 
personality disorder and, therefore, section 8 was necessary to 
take it out of that realm. Alternatively, the whole Act could be 
read as stating mental disorder under the 2001 Act was not 
intended to cover personality disorder.”56   
Note also that while a person is detained under section 4 of 
the 2006 Act using civil criteria from the 2001 Act, he or she does 
not have the same rights as a patient detained under the 2001 Act.  
For example, the civil patient is detained for an initial period of 
21 days, within which there must be a review by a Mental Health 
Tribunal, while the case of a person found not guilty by reason of 
insanity need only be reviewed every six months by the Mental 
Health (Criminal Law) Review Board. 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
56 176 Seanad Debates 259 (Committee Stage, 7 April 2004). 
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III. THE OPTIONAL “TRIAL OF THE FACTS” 
There is no compulsory “trial of the facts” before a 
committal order is made. Instead, section 4(8) provides for an 
optional trial of the facts: 
 
Upon a determination having been made by the court 
that an accused person is unfit to be tried it may on 
application to it in that behalf allow evidence to be 
adduced before it as to whether or not the accused 
person did the act alleged and if the court is satisfied that 
there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused did 
the act alleged, it shall order the accused to be 
discharged. 
 
The original Bill referred to evidence as to whether the 
accused person “committed” the act alleged, but this was later 
changed to “did” the act alleged. Minister Lenihan said that the 
word “committed” carries a connotation that people might have 
known what they were doing when they committed the act and 
that it could be argued the word “did” is more neutral in that 
regard.57  
If a trial of the facts takes place, there are restrictions on 
media reporting of the case in s.4(9). The restrictions were 
introduced as if a court concludes that there is not reasonable 
doubt that an accused did the act alleged, such a conclusion could 
be prejudicial to the interests and good name of the accused 
thereafter or at any future trial.58  
If the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the accused did the act, he or she is “discharged” and the 
word “acquitted” is not used. However, Minister McDowell 
stated:  
 
In effect, these provisions provide that where, despite the 
fact that the accused is unfit to be tried, the court is 
satisfied that there is a reasonable doubt that he or she 
committed the alleged act, it will acquit him or her. 
Accused persons may be unfit to be tried but if the court 
is, nonetheless, in a position to acquit them and say they 
_____________________________________________________ 
57 180 Seanad Debates 32 (Report and Final Stages, 19 April 2005). 
58 180 Seanad Debates 33 (Report and Final Stages, 19 April 2005). 
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are innocent, they should not be denied the benefit of 
having their innocence established merely by virtue of 
the fact that they have had some intervening mental 
illness.59 
 
In England and Wales, a person who is found unfit to plead 
cannot be detained by a criminal court unless it has first been 
found that he or she did the alleged act.60 It is regrettable that the 
new Act does not require a compulsory “trial of the facts” before 
a person who has been found unfit for trial can be detained. If a 
trial of the facts is being introduced, it is difficult to see why it 
ought to be optional.61 The “trial of the facts” system serves the 
very useful purpose of ensuring that the strength of the 
prosecution’s case is tested before it is possible to detain the 
person. While the defendant’s mental disorder may well restrict 
his or her ability to contradict the prosecution’s case, at least the 
defendant is given an opportunity to attempt to do so. If the 
defendant’s efforts fail, the result is not a finding of guilt, it is a 
finding that he or she did the act or made the omission charged. 
Restrictions on media reporting of the ‘trial of the facts’ (as in 
s.4(9) of the 2006 Act) protect defendants’ reputations, and 
ensure a fair trial if they become fit to plead at a later stage.62  If 
the defendant successfully contradicts the prosecution’s case, then 
the defendant is discharged and cannot be detained. The trial of 
the facts is also consistent with the right to a speedy trial under 
the Irish Constitution and Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention. 
There has been contradictory case law in England on the 
question of the scope of an inquiry into whether the person “did” 
the act.63  In R. v. Antoine64 the House of Lords held that a trial of 
_____________________________________________________ 
59 171 Seanad Debates 771 (Second Stage, 19 February 2003). 
60 Section 4A Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 as inserted by s.4 
Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991. 
61 Similarly, see Boland, “The Criminal Justice (Mental Disorder) Bill 1996” 
[1997] 4 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues in ‘unfitness to plead’ section. 
62 Connelly, “Insanity and Unfitness to Plead” [1996] Juridical Review 206 at 
211. 
63 R. v. Egan [1997] Crim L.R. 225; Attorney General’s Reference (No.3 of 
1998) [1999] 3 All E.R. 40. 
64 [2001] 1 A.C. 340. 
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the facts is only concerned with the actus reus of the offence, not 
the mens rea. Defences such as mistake or self-defence may be 
considered if there is objective evidence concerning them. 
However, it has been held that provocation may not be 
considered.65 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
65 R. v. Grant [2001] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2611; [2002] 1 Q.B. 1030. 
